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Manuel Fombona*
In the second half of 1970, demand for oil began to outrun supply
and prices began slowly but steadily to increase, up to the Middle
East conflict in October 1973, when they abruptly rocketed
upwards. The trends underlying these price increases are more
complex than usually assumed, and are certainly not entirely due to
the justified demands of the producing countries for a higher revenue
from their oil exports. The new prices reflect a profound change in
the structure of the oil industry with far-reaching effects for the
world economy. The present energy crisis has its roots in the political
economy of the oil industry and not, as argued by the prophets of
doomsday, in the depletion of oil reserves within one or two
generations.
A great number of factors will, therefore, affect the ability of OPEC
to sustain or raise current price levels. For the purposes of this paper
we will draw attention to the ones we regard as the most relevant,
namely: (a) future trends in oil demand stemming from current price
levels 1 (b) the potentialities regarding increases in supply (c) the
political coherence of OPEC.
Characteristics of Demand
A. In the short term
It is generally agreed that in the short term, say, 19 74-76 oil prices
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1 In the discussion which follows, "current prices" are taken to mean those
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tax rates of the oil producers is explained in the "Diary of Events" by Frank
Ellis in this bulletin.
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are unlikely to be brought down by events on the demand side of the
international market. The reasons supporting this statement are as
follows:
Low short-term price elasticity of demand. This reflects the fact
that oil has come to be a basic necessity in the economic and
industrial structure of consuming countries. Its uses for mobility
fuels (aircrafts, vehicles, diesel trains and ships bunkers) for space
heating, steam raising (electricity and industrial power) and as a
petrochemical feedstock (plastic, fertilisers) have reached a degree of
dependence which would make major reductions in consumption
impossible in the short term.
Low short-term cross-elasticity of demand. Oil consumption
cannot be reduced immediately simply because the price has become
less competitive relative to other energy sources. Alternative sources
are not perfectly substitutable since equipment designed for oil must
usually be scrapped if conversion to gas or coal is contemplated. This
involves not only high capital costs (e.g. some £0.5 million for UK
household conversion to North Sea gas) but a considerable delay, as
conversion would take several years. It should also be borne in mind
that oil was relatively low-priced in comparison to some other
sources of energy and therefore much of the price rise merely
reduces its comparative advantage.
Feasibility of rationing. The experience of rationing schemes
has not been successful. Moreover for rationing to be effective it
would require the concerted action of all the major consuming
countries, which must be regarded as very unlikely.
B. In the long term
The long-term picture is less certain since much depends on the speed
of technological innovation and the introduction of new energy
sources. The following points may be made:
(a) Demand satisfied from sources of oil other than OPEC
Efforts to develop existing alternative reserves will be increased
(e.g. North Sea oil and Alaska).
Current prices will lead to extraction of oil from sources
previously uneconomic (tar sands, oil shale).
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What matters for the demand for OPEC oil is the cost and prices at
which these alternative supplies might become available. Current
estimates for the costs of North Sea and Alaska oil vary considerably
according to source (oil companies, independent researchers) but are
generally reckoned to be between $2 and $6 a barrel. However, even
if further discoveries eventually enable production to be raised well
above levels currently envisaged they seem unlikely ever to make a
really significant impact on the demand for OPEC oil. Production of
oil from tar sands and oil shales, variously estimated as costing
around $7 per barrel require technical developments, environmental
clearance and massive capital injections. The lead times are so long at
present that these will have no direct impact on demand for OPEC
oil before 1980 and little major impact before 1985.
(b) Demand satisfied from alternative sources of energy
This poses a greater threat to the long-term stability of current oil
price levels. There will evidently be some switching in all consuming
sectors to alternative fuels.
Electricity generation converted to coal or nuclear power.
More extensive use of hydro-electric potential.
Accelerated development of alternatives to the internal
combustion engine.
Conversion of domestic and office heating to natural gas.
Offsetting these tendencies will be the high cost of the conversion
work itself, as well as the increased demand for other sources
resulting from conversion. This will bid up the prices of alternative
sources.
(c) Research and development of new energy sources
In whatever direction R & D moves in the future as a consequence of
the increase in oil prices, account must be taken of the cost of such
research, and the long delays before new energy sources become a
commercial propoSition.
(d) Greater efficiency in use
The greatest single factor in the growth in demand for oil is the result
over time of a change in attitudes from regarding oil as cheap and
plentiful to acknowledging it as expensive and insecure. All future
70
CAN OPEC MAINTAIN CURRENT PRICES?
research, design and choices in the market for oil burning machines
in the western developed world will henceforth be influenced by this
change a change that will be progressively reinforced by fiscal,
legislative and possibly social forces. As there is so much waste in
existing utilisation patterns, it is possible to envisage continued
growth in industrialised economies without major growth in oil
demand and imports over the next decade. This however would
require a collective self-discipline that is not yet apparent in the
affluent societies and that cannot be taken for granted.
In summary demand factors suggest that OPEC may indeed be able
to maintain prices at current levels. This is because of the high cost
of conversion to alternative fuels; the high cost and delays in research
and development in new fuels; and the fact that oil is by no means
priced out of the market at current levels. Whether there is any
possibility of increasing prices further without causing collapse of
demand in the long term is a rather different question and one which
will not be answered here.
The Supply Situation
General considerations
It is apparent that oil producing countries are no longer going to
allow their rates of production to be determined solély by oil
importers' requirements, and this therefore necessitates a more
detailed analysis of the factors influencing production decisions and
the range of practicable options open to them.
In the past, the volume of production in individual countries was
primarily determined by the international oil companies to meet
their expected market demands. Production levels are now largely in
the control of the governments of the producing countries. Questions
on optimal depletion rates, conservation, reserve/production ratios
led to cutbacks in production in Libya in 1970, and in Kuwait and
Venezuela in 1972.
The short and medium term (1974-1980)
It is difficult to prepare up-to-date forecasts of world crude oil
production, taking into account the price incentives created by the
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recent OPEC decisions and their effects in bringing onto the market
the production of some of the marginal oil fields of producing and
consuming countries (as well as faster development of other sources
of energy).
It seems likely that the more populous countries of OPEC will
continue to expand production carefully within technical limits
e.g. Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran and possibly Algeria although even
those countries may be inclined to defer marginal production.
Kuwait and Libya are likely to maintain or even intensify their policy
of restriction. This implies that any major increase in production will
have to come from Iraq, Abu Dhabi or Saudi Arabia. All three have
referred on occasions to plans to raise production potential towards
levels of 4.0, 3.5 and 20.0 million b/d respectively by 1980. The
production policies of these countries will not be determined by
technical factors, but fundamentally by political considerations of
both an internal as well as an external nature.
To obtain a clearer feel for the significance of changes in decisions on
production levels by individual OPEC members, we attach three
TABLE 1
Three Scenarios for oil supply in the 1970s.








1974 1980 1974 1980 1974 1980
Iraq 2.3 5.0 2.3 3.0 2.5 5.0
Kuwait 2.7 2.8 2.1 1.5 2.5 3.0
Saudi Arabia 7.7 9.1 7.6 5.8 8.3 12.D
Neutral Zone 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.5 - -
Abu Dhabi 1.6 3.0 1.0 1.5 1.9 3.5
Qatar 0.5 0.5 0.5 D.4 D.6 0.9
Iran 6.2 7.5 5.8 5.5 6.5 8.0
Algeria 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.2 1.5
Libya 1.9 2.2 1.4 1.0 2.3 2.5
Nigeria 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.0 2.5 3.5
Indonesia 1.5 2.4 1.5 2.0 1.8 3.2
Venezuela 3.2 2.0 2.4 1.0 3.4 3.2
Ecuador 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.7
TOTAL OPEC 31.3 39.0 27.7 24.6 33.8 47.0
CAN OPEC MAINTAIN CURRENT PRICES?
"scenario projections" (Table 1). The first is a projection of a
possible "high supply scenario". This reflects continuing growth in
demand, albeit at a lower level than hitherto. It reflects the potential
for growth in production in certain Arab countries but assumes that
financial and other considerations will progressively reduce the rate
of production.
The second is one in which the growth in world demand is
progressively reduced from former levels of around 8% compound
per annum to modest levels. Most producers meet this reduced
growth by broadly sticking to current levels of production, with
expansion virtually confined to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Abu Dhabi. In
this projection Saudi Arabia's surplus fund accumulation is contained
by coming back from peak production of 10 million b/d around
1978. This can be called a "demand determined" scenario.
As a third alternative we have a "supply constrained scenario" in
which the implications are contained in the individual decisions of oil
producers to reduce production towards levels that closely
approximate their development needs, given the current level of
prices. In order to maintain the reqiirements of industrialised
economies without incurring serious risk of economic dislocation,
Saudi Arabia is shown as still producing a volume of oil of around
eight million b/d in the mid-1970s, but OPEC's production in
aggregate is at levels slightly lower than those reached in 1973.
It is certainly possible to extend the range of scenario projections but
these three illustrate the likely range and are indicative of the sort of
supply/demand circumstances in which political and other
considerations will probably operate.
Even in the "supply constrained" scenario Saudi Arabia is shown as
producing a volume of oil vastly in excess of the revenue needs of the
country, while in all three scenarios Saudi Arabia is producing at
much less than its technical capacity. This illustrates the key role of
that country in any analysis of OPEC's capacity to maintain prices in
the period under review.
(c) The longer run (after 1980)
Although there is a current consensus among geologists, for what it is
worth, that ultimate conventional oil reserves will prove to be about
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three times current levels, there declining expectations of finding a
"second Middle East". If anything the best prospects lie in the
Middle East itself and this will merely reinforce the power of OPEC.
Moreover, major discoveries in or adjacent to any of the smaller and
less populated countries of the world will generate the same pressures
for new producing countries to conform to the same patterns of
response as those of OPEC members. Membership of OPEC will thus
tend to grow but growth should not, per se, have any significant
effect in weakening its powers.
The Political Coherence of OPEC
The political coherence of OPEC has not been an easy matter to
achieve given the political, economic, social and institutional
differences between the various countries that make up the
organisation. Table 2 lists the relevant factors that should determine
the optimum rate of oil extraction in oil producing countries; and
the differences in terms of reserves and oil production, population,
gross national product, and expected revenues between the different
countries, become quite evident.
During the 1960s when prices were at a very low level Venezuela
tried unsuccessfully to negotiate an agreement within OPEC for
reducing supply by the prior rationing of production among its
members. This formula was the only one capable of giving the oil
producing countries a measure of control over their own resources as
well as higher revenues for developmental purposes. The proposals
gained the support of countries such as Indonesia and Iraq, but were
flatly rejected by Saudi Arabia and Iran and in the end were not
adopted.
The conditions prevailing in the 1960s and underlying the weakness
of OPEC during the period can be summarised as follows:
the divergence of interest of the member countries that barred
the way to any agreement capable of raising the price for oil in the
international market.
The production, transport, refining and marketing of oil
continued under the control of the multinational companies. The
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governments of the oil producing countries were mere tax-collectors
which from time to time introduced timid administrative controls
upon the industry.
(iii) An abundance of oil in the international market.
TABLE 2
Factors determining oil production - the economic characteristics of the
OPEC countries.
Various sources: OPEC Bulletins and exults of individual research by J. Charron! SarmIento, Peru; F00. Enwefah, NIgeria,
G. Jilliogs, United Kingdom; PA. Rodriquez. Venezuela; A. Zarinnia, Iran.
1970 marks the dividing line for the international oil industry when
oil prices began to escalate and a buyers' market was suddenly
transformed into a sellers' market. This has certainly strengthened
OPEC as an organisation and has placed within its orbit the setting of
oil prices which was previously in the hands of the oil companies.
Whether this newly acquired responsibility will further strengthen
the organisation in the future, or will turn out to be a divisive force





Dhobp Kcwo:r Qatar Libya Iraq Algorio Irac Venezuela Nigerit Inndorreena
A. Supply factcrs
#eseroea 1.1.73 billion 551e 146.0 208 72.9 7.0 30.4 29.0 10.5 65.0 137 15.0 10.0
Production ist
quarter 1973 rn:Il:orr bld 7.2 1.3 3.3 0.6 2,3 1.7 1.1 5.8 3.3 1.9 1,2
Current 8/P rocio years 57.0 45.0 66.0 32.0 35.1 47.5 25.1 30.9 11.4 21.6 25.0
Years ro declive
lacro growthl years 46.0 34.0 49.6 21.0 253 35.8 15.2 19.8 10.5 10.7 15.0
Exploras pon
expectations HIGH FAIR LOW LOW LOW HIGH LOW MEDIUM LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM
B. Demand Factors
Pupslatiorr 1973 million 7.8 0.1 1.0 0.14 2.2 10.4 15.4 31.5 11.2 59.4 124.0
GNP/per capita
1872 SUS 540 3150 3860 2370 1450 370 360 460 1060 140 80
Forai gn exchange
recercas Nos. 19731 billicx 3.5 - 0.4 - 2.0 1.0 1.0 0,5 1.1 0.3 0.9
C. Eapected Rasenue
1975 Recensa
per barrel bbl 7.61 816 7,58 7.91 10,33 8.28 10.07 7.68 8.89 9,48 5.02
1975 total rexenues
lIBRO Estimates
January 19741 billion 22.55 6,55 8.7 1.85 10.05 7.55 4.25 17.1 10.55 8.50 2.20
0. Other Facrxrc
added LOW LOW LOW LOW LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM NIGH MEDIUM HIGH HIGH
Future price
objectives DOWN DOWN UP - UP UP UP UP UP
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underlying the rapid increase in prices in the early 1970s may
provide us with a better clue to what the future holds for OPEC,
than the simplistic calculation of supply potentials.
The increase in prices in the period from 1970 up to the October war
in 1973 was due in part to an extraordinary rate of increase in the
demand for oil and to cutbacks in production in Libya and Kuwait.
Oil consumption during the first nine months of 1973 was 11.3%
above the same period of 1972 while consumption in 1972 as 7.2%
above that of 1971. The curtailment of production in Libya was the
result of retaliatory measures taken by the multinationals as a
consequence of the partial nationalisation of the industry in that
country. Kuwait had to curtail production when she rather belatedly
became aware that her reserve production ratio was much lower than
the oil companies had led her to believe.
The Middle East conflict of 1973 hastened an already confirmed
trend. The oil embargo that ensued was linked with a 25%
curtailment of production by the Arab states. In January 1974 prices
underwent a fourfold increase as compared with 1970. Whether
prices would have reached those levels in a gradual way at a later
stage, as a consequence of the trends in the international market is
difficult to say: the point to be stressed is that both in early 1970
and following the October war in 1973, OPEC responded to events
that were by no means endogenous to the pure economic
characteristics of the oil market. The price rises were not the
consequence of a deliberate policy pursued by the organisation, but
the consequence of political and economic events of a much wider
significance. OPEC has certainly been successful in the 1970s but in
our view part of its success has been in spite of itself.
The dynamic of events in the world, and specially in the Middle East,
point strongly towards a solution of the conflict in that area. The
embargo imposed by the Arabs on certain countries of the western
world has been lifted and production will soon reach pre October
1973 levels. The main issue that arises is how the Arab countries will
respond after ending the embargo, and in particular, what will be
their production policy, in view of the present level of prices and its
effects both on the surplus funds they are accumulating and on the
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demand for crude oil from the industrialised countries. The pattern
of divergence of interest between member countries, so noticeable
during the 1960s, is still very much present in the post October
period, but admittedly under different circumstances. The
consolidation of the gains already obtained will depend to a large
extent on whether OPEC will be able for the first time to act as a
coherent institution with clearly defined objectives.
The differences of opinion in the organisation were sharply present
at the meeting held in Quito in June of this year, when a compromise
agreement was reached to keep oil prices stable for.a further three
months. It is well known that some countries such as Algeria,
Ecuador, Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela pressed for a further increase in
the price of oil; while Saudi Arabia was seeking a 20% reduction. In
these circumstances the question was postponed for an extraordinary
meeting of OPEC to be held in Vienna in September of this year. The
final declaration reflected the compromise between the two powerful
conflicting views when it stated that the industrialised countries had
a last opportunity to bring inflation under control or otherwise price
increases would follow.
The differences between Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the
organisation may deepen in the future over this fundamental issue.
The government of Saudi Arabia argues that the rise in oil prices has
been too severe, and is endangering the stability of the western world
on which Saudi Arabia, given its level of development and its
socio-political structure, depends.
The Strategy and Objectives of the Oil Companies
One of the most obvious and striking consequences of the "oil crisis"
has been the extraordinary high profits reaped by the international
oil companies.2
The events that have taken place in the oil producing countries in the
1970s, shifting the control of production from the oil corporations
to the governments, were foreseen by the multinationals at a much
2 See "Diary of Events" by Frank Ellis in this bulletin.
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earlier stage. The oil companies were able in the 1950s and 1960s to
maintain oil prices at very low levels because of the tight control
they exerted over all the phases of production and distribution. The
rationale for these low prices was to keep out new entrants that
might have jeopardised the monopoly power of the cartel. With the
growth of nationalism in Asia, Africa and Latin America after the
second world war and given the knowledge acquired by the
producing countries in the running of the oil industry, it became
clear that a shift in ownership was at least possible if not imminent.
One of the long-run objectives of the companies has been to extend
their monopoly into alternative sources of energy, an objective they
have gone a long way towards achieving; particularly given the
financial resources at their command and their technological
knowhow which together constitute the basis of their economic and
political power. In the USA the five major American oil companies
control 50% of the atomic energy industry and 32% of that country's
coal production. It is against this background that the multinationals
have started the implementation of a strategy for reducing their
operations in the Middle East and other OPEC countries; this
withdrawal will be gradual and may last anything between 10 and 20
years. The likely fall in the rate of profit in the near future, caused
by the growing demands of the oil producing countries for a bigger
share in the industry, together with the requirement that they should
reinvest part of the profits obtained from their operations in the
countries concerned have slowed down considerably the rate of
investment of the corporations in oil ventures in those areas.
In order to make the best of this situation, the oil companies have
since 1970 implemented the following strategy in accordance with
their long-term objectives already mentioned:
to bring about a steep increase in the price of OPEC oil to the
levels prevailing in the USA, in order to eliminate the price
differential enjoyed by Western Europe and Japan, which by paying
a much lower price for their oil were in an advantageous competitive
position;
to obtain an increase in their profit margins in an industry that
hungers for financial resources in view of the investments required
for maintaining a reasonable reserve/production ratio;
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(iii) to make new sources of energy within the USA available for
commercial exploitation.
It is of no small significance that during the last ten years the search
for crude oil, as well as for non-conventional sources of oil, has been
almost entirely restricted to the developed nations and a few
countries considered to be firmly entrenched within USA's zone of
influence. Oil prospecting has been very intensive in the North Sea,
Alaska, Canada and the Amazon basin while research has been
directed towards solving the technological problems involved in the
exploitation of bituminous shale, coal, and the Athbasca sands. As an
example that confirms this trend we can point out that the oil
companies in Venezuela have not invested any significant amount of
money in exploration activities since 1965.
We can thus summarise the medium and long-term objectives of the
multinationals as follows:
to monopolise all alternative sources of energy such as coal,
bituminous shale, asphaltic sands, atomic energy, etc;
the gradual reduction of dependence for oil from developing
countries which are considered politically unstable for investment
purposes;
the maintenance of a high level of oil prices for making other
sources of energy competitive with oil;
to increase their control in the distribution and marketing side
of the industry in order to compensate for the losses in production.
As Ernest Harsch has pointed out, " the United States
monopolies have welcomed the oil price hikes as a way to make
domestic oil and alternate energy sources more competitive with
foreign oil. Domestic crude oil had been selling for $5.25 to $8.73
per barrel and estimates for shale oil extraction range from $6 to $8
per barrel. Thus, the increase in the world market price of oil from
Arab-Persian Gulf makes domestic oil more competitive and the large
capital outlay for the development of shale oil more feasible. From
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the viewpoint of the oil companies, further price hikes would not be
necessary".3
It is clear by now that in the price rises of the 1970s the oil
companies played an active role, though the full details of that role
are unlikely to be uncovered until recent events have become history.
It seems obvious that the OPEC countries may rely at least on a
certain amount of indifference on the part of the large corporations
and the US government in their efforts to maintain prevailing price
levels. For the US economy as a whole, given the large energy
resources and plentiful capital with which that country is endowed,
the high prices may to some extent be welcomed in the medium and
long term for they will restore the competitivity of American
industry vis â vis the industry of Europe and Japan and will have the
effect of encouraging moves towards self.sufficiency in energy
production - an option not attainable in the foreseeable future for
either Europe or Japan.
Review ¡EEC Spectrum, July 1973.
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